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The theory of contestable markets offers an analytic framework within which 
the fundamental features of demand and technology determine the industry structure 
and the characteristics of industry prices. The theory accomplishes this by making 
the following simplifying assumptions:
i) all producers have access to the same technology;
ii) the technology may have fixed costs, but no sunk costs;1
iii) there is no entry lag, that is, a potential entrant can enter at any scale
instantaneously;
iv) the incumbent's adjustment price lag is greater than the exit lag; that is, a
v .
potential entrant can enter thé market, make a profit and exit before the
incumbent can react to entry.
In other words, the theory "strips away through its assumptions all barriers to entry 
and exit and the strategic behaviour that goes along with them both in theory and 
reality".2 In particular, the assumptions of no entry lag and of a positive adjustment 
price lag are relevant in that they capture the idea of "hit-and-run entry", which 
represents a fundamental element in disciplining active firms. Indeed, a crucial issue 
of this literature is the extent to which potential competition is able to serve the role 
that actual competition does in traditional economic models: under the assumptions 
above, potential competition can be as effective as actual competition in disciplining 
the industry.
In this paper the robustness of the relevant assumptions of contestable markets 
is discussed, with special attention to those applying to firms' reaction time. 
Although Baumol, Panzar and Willig carefully acknowledge the importance of fast 
price responses by incumbent firms, this question is frequently overlooked in the 




























































































contrary, structural conditions that make entry and exit easy, such as low sunk costs, 
are taken as sufficient to ensure contestability.3
Schwartz (1986) is an exception. He tackles the question of how small the 
neighborhood of zero sunk costs must be in order to have "almost perfectly 
contestable" markets. He argues that this neighborhood is arbitrarily small: as a 
consequence, a small deviation from zero sunk costs is sufficient to make the threat of 
entry irrelevant and yield the monopoly price. Available empirical evidence offered in 
that paper indicates that this is typically the case.
Furthermore, he argues that as the price response lag goes to zero, whatever the 
level of sunk cost is, the market becomes "non-conlestable” . In other words, the 
ability of incumbent firms to change price rapidly in response to entry can offset ease 
of entry and exit and make markets non-contestable, in the sense that pricing 
behaviour becomes unaffected by the threat of entry. However, these results are not 
quite satisfactory in some respects. We show in Section 2 that in order to get 
non-contestable markets it is necessary to know whether the level of sunk costs is 
small in relation to the price response lag, and not only that the price response lag 
goes to zero. That is to say, we cannot predict the relationship of price to average 
costs based only on the smallness of the sunk costs or of the price response lag: we 
need to have an estimate of their relative size too. Moreover, our analysis is more 
rigorous and specifies the type of market competition after entry, an element which is 
left unspecified in Schwartz's paper.
One may wonder whether it is exhaustive to examine the robustness of the 
theory of contestable markets by considering the behaviour of sunk costs and price 
response lags only. For example, is it possible to obtain a non-contestable outcome 
when the firms, instead of competing in the post-entry market, were to collude? If 
firms were to collude, potential competition would not benefit consumers and it would 




























































































Our analysis in Section 3 shows that this is indeed the case. The framework within 
which we examine collusion is that of infinitely repeated games. As is well-known, 
collusion is indeed a possible outcome in infinitely repeated games.
A game-theoretic framework is used also in Section 4, where we examine the 
necessary conditions under which the "hit-and-run" strategy is the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium solution of a repeated game with infinite horizon.
The story is similar to that in Benoit (1984). In his model he supposes that the 
entrant can survive an aggressive response for only a limited number of periods, 
say Y , while the incumbent can respond aggressively ad infinitum; both the 
incumbent and the entrant know Y, the horizon is unlimited and the incumbent is 
surely willing to respond aggressively if the entrant can be driven out in one period4. In 
this situation the entrant's optimal strategy is not to enter (and if it does, it 
capitulates immediately and exits), and the incumbent's to play tough; this result can 
be proved by induction.
In our formulation a specification of that model is presented and is applied to 
the contestable markets. We allow the incumbent the option to continue or not 
fighting each period and to the entrant to stay or not in each period. Our process of 
entry is sequential. Moreover, in our formulation we allow an entrant to re-enter the 
industry after playing "exit".
In what follows we adopt a discrete-time formulation. This does not seem to be 
harmful because the main results of our analysis do not depend on time interval. It is 
well-known, however, that different outcomes may sometimes arise when continuous 
time formulations are adopted instead of discrete time ones: some issues related to 
this question are briefly tackled in Section 3.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is set up. Here 
the price response lag hypothesis is discussed and the consequences of dropping it are 




























































































the post-entry game is analysed. Section 4 studies the exit decision of the entrant: in 
particular, it gives the necessary conditions to obtain a "hit--and-run" strategy as the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with infinite horizon. In 





























































































2. A MODEL OF LIMIT-PRICING WITH SUNK COSTS AND PRICE 
RESPONSE LAGS: THE ROLE OF FAST PRICE RESPONSES.
2.1 THE BASIC MODEL
In this section we present the basic model which will be used throughout the 
paper. We consider a market for a homogeneous product characterized by a demand 
function g(p) which is defined for all p > 0 and satisfies the following assumptions5:
A .l ( i)g  is continuous on and continuously differentiable on the set P, where 
P =  {p > 0 | g (p )> 0 }1
(ii) g(p) > 0 for all p > 0,
(iii) g(p) is non increasing everywhere and strictly decreasing on P,
(iv) lim ^  p.g(p) = 0.
The marginal cost of production is constant and equal to c >  0. The profit 
function is then defined by Il(p) = (p -c ).g (p ). The following properties hold: II is 
continuous on and continuously differentiable on P; 11(c) =  0, II(p) <  0 for all p, 
and 0 <  p <  c, II(p) > 0 for p > c. Furthermore, lim __ ^  Il(p) =  0. Consequently, 
the profit function has a maximum that is denoted by fln. We assume that the 
following property6 holds:
A.2 n  is strictly quasi-concave on [c, +oo) and c € P.
This ensures that rim >  0 and that there exists a unique price at which II is maximum. 




























































































n'(p) = 0, i.e.:
(1) (Pm-c)g'(Pm) + g(pn) =  0.
Notice that a further consequence of our assumptions is that If is strictly increasing on 
the interval [c,pm] .
Let us suppose that there are two firms; we denote by i the incumbent firm and 
by e the potential entrant. Firm i sets a pre-entry price p, which it can change with a 
lag T, called the response lag, T > 0. The potential entrant observes p and decides 
whether or not to enter. If e does not enter, its payoff is zero. If e chooses to enter, 
then i is unable to react instantaneously to entry by lowering the price: until time T e 
can price just below p and get the whole market. After time T, i is allowed to change 
its price in response to e's entry: i and e compete in some way which will be specified 
later. We denote by Wg the present value at date T of e's profit flow after time T.
We suppose that entry into the industry requires a cost s, s > 0, to be sunk. For 
a given interest rate, we denote by r the discount factor, 0 <  r <  1 and we define 
k(t) =  (1-r ) /( l -r ) . The present discounted value of the entrant's profit is then given 
by:
Of course e will enter if and only if Vg > 0. If Vg = 0, e is indifferent between staying 
out and entering. Two cases may occur:
(2) Ve(p|T,s) = n(p)k(T) + WerT -s.
(a) nm<(s-W erT)/k(T),
(b) nm> (s -W erT)/k(T).




























































































the entry threat is binding. Let us denote by p* =  p(s,T) the entry-preventing price. 
It satisfies the equation : Vp(p* |T,s) =  0, i.e.:
(3) n(p*) = (s -W erT)/k(T).
It is uniquely defined in case (b) and such that c < p* <  pm ; as a consequence, it 
satisfies the following condition:
(4) (p*-c)g'(p*) + g(p*)>0
In the following subsection, Wg= 0 will be assumed. This is the rase normally 
considered in the theory of contestable markets: if the entrant's best strategy is to 
"hit-and-run", then certainly Wg=  0. Alternatively, this may occur as a result of 
price competition after time T, as a conventional Bertrand equilibrium, with price 
equal to marginal cost. If s =  0 but T >  0, then the outcome of contestable markets 
arises: from (2), i is vulnerable to entry whatever price it charges above c.
Here we will first test the robustness of the theory of contestable markets to 
small changes in assumptions,in particular the claim of Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1983): "when there are almost no sunk costs, markets axe almost perfectly 
contestable".
2.1 SUNK COST APPROACH
Baumol, Panzar and Willig propose the following representation of imperfect 
contestability. In their approach exit can take place anytime, but a sunk cost s is lost 
if exit occurs. In other words, in expression (2), Wg = 0 and any exit cost is included 
in s. Therefore expression (2) becomes:




























































































Let s0 be such that s0 =  nmk(T). Thus for any s < So, case (b) occurs and 
therefore there exists an entry-preventing price p* which is a solution of (2), that is:
(6) n(p*) =  s/k(T)
Given that inequality (4) holds, a straightforward consequence of the differentiation 
of (6) with respect to s and T is that p* is increasing in s and decreasing in T.
The following Proposition assesses the robustness of contestability theory with 
respect to small sunk costs:
Proposition 1. Let T >  0. When there are almost no sunk costs, then there is 
(almost) no deviation of p* from the average cost price, i.e,
lims_ 0+ P Ŝ,T) = c-
Proof The proof is straightforward. Indeed since p(0,T) =  c and p(s,T) is continuous 
at s = 0 , then lims_ >0+ p(s,T) = c. |
Remark 1. Proposition 1 is in keeping with Baumol, Panzar and Willig's claim about 
the robustness of contestable markets with respect to small sunk costs. However,if 
T —* 0 and s—* 0, then the level of p* depends on the relative speeds at which T and s 
go to zero. If s does not go more rapidly to zero than T, then the market is not 
"almost" contestable. In other words, we cannot predict the relationship of price to 
average cost based on the smallness of s and T only, but we need to know whether s is 




























































































2.2 EXIT LAG APPROACH
An alternative way of modeling imperfect contestability is to assume a positive 
exit lag, say Y, due for example to contractual obligations. Let us consider the 
possibility that e can recover the cost s entirely if it leaves the market at time r, where 
r =  T+Y, but suppose that Wg <  0, e.g. the two firms incur a price war after T which 
ends up with losses for both firms. We denote by -F j the one period loss of firm j, 
j =  i,e , Fj > 0; therefore we get Wg =  - F er^ '(l-r^ )/(l-r ). Then expression (2) 
becomes:
(7) Ve(p|T,s) = n (p )k (T )-F ek(Y)r2T
9TLet Y0 be such that Hm = Fpr k(Y0)/k(T). Thus for any Y < Y„ there exists an 
entry-preventing price p* = p(Y,T) which satisfies equation Vp(p*|T,s) =  0, i.e.:
(8) n(p*) = Fer2Tk(Y)/k(T)
Given that condition (4) holds, a straightforward consequence of the differentiation of 
(8) with respect to Y and T is that p* is increasing in Y and decreasing in T.
The following proposition is the analogue in the exit lag approach of 
Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. Let T >  0. When there is almost no exit lag, there is (almost) no 
deviation of p* from the average cost price, i.e,




























































































Proof. The proof is straightforward. Indeed since p(0,T) = c and p(Y,T) is 
continuous at Y =  0, then limy^Q.^ p(Y,T) =  c. |
Proposition 2 states that a short exit lag implies that exit from the market is 
easy. Therefore "hit-and-run" is easier and the market is more contestable. Again, if 
T —* 0, Y—< 0 but Y does not go to zero more rapidly than T, then the market is not 
"almost" contestable. Accordingly, both the sunk cost model and the exit lag model 
show that instantaneous price responses can lead the incumbent to ignore entry 





























































































Let us consider expression (2) with the assumption Wg>  0. For this case to 
occur, e must expect either (i) that i will leave the market at T, so that e could 
become the incumbent, or (ii) that the two firms could share the market and make a 
profit.
Case (i) is examined by Farrell (1986). Obviously, this case is not considered in 
the theory of contestable markets, since this theory assumes that the incumbent faces 
both a price response lag and an exit lag, that is, exit is not frictionless to the 
incumbent: in this way the threat of "hit-and-run" entry can constrain the 
incumbent's behaviour. Indeed, if the possibility of exit was allowed to the 
incumbent, he would price monopolistically to exploit any entry lag and hence 
potential competition would be completely ineffective. Notice the implausible 
asymmetry between incumbent and entrants' behaviour: in this theory entrants can 
costlessly "hit-and-run", but for the incumbent firm both entry and exit are not 
frictionless.
We examine now case (ii), that is, the incumbent rather than fight entry may 
seek to accommodate it. If firms were instead to collude, potential competition would 
not benefit consumers, it would merely encourage entry, as monopoly profits would be 
redistributed among firms. It is therefore significant to explore under what conditions 
it is possible to have a result of collusion. Such collusion is a possible outcome in 
infinitely repeated games.
To study this case let us consider the following game with infinite horizon. 
There are two firms in the market, the incumbent firm i and the entrant e. Assume as 
before that the incumbent firm can change the price with a lag T. Consider the 
following strategies for each agent. Firm i can either deter entry or allow entry by the 




























































































the corresponding level of profit, as defined by (6), i.e. If* =  s/k(T). Firm e decides 
whether to enter (a =  1) or not to enter (a  =  0) and chooses a price level p 6 [c,pn]. 
When both firms are on the market and charge the price pm, we assume that they 
share the market in a fixed way, a proportion 7 being allocated to e, where 0 <  7 <  1 . 
Obviously, the choices available to the two firms are the following:
firm e: to charge pm if firm i is accommodating, and to undercut it by charging
some p <  pm for T periods if i is not accommodating.
firm i: to charge pm if firm e charges pm, or to fight e with a permanent move to
the competitive price c if e deviates from pm by undercutting.
We want to establish under which circumstances tacit collusion will emerge, i.e. 
whether allowing entry and charging the monopoly price is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium for this game:
Proposition 3. Collusion is an equilibrium outcome if:
\ r  n T sf 1— ,  1 II*Max [1-r , -^j— < 7 <  1 -
Proof. Consider the payoffs that the two firms obtain from playing the strategies 
described above. Deviation from collusion is not profitable for e if the following two 
conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
(9) T^t =  0 rtn," > s
(10) ^It =0 >  ) J = 0 rtn(p)- s ’ *or all P < Pm





























































































Condition (9) is equivalent to:
( 12) s < 7 t% -
Since nm>n(p) for all p < pm, the inequality (10) holds if 7lln/( l - r )  > Ilrak(T) 
or, equivalently, if:
(13) 7 >  l-rT - 
Prom expression ( 11) we get:
(H) ( i - 7)n„>n*.
Combining (12), (13) and (14), it follows that
(!5 ) Max [ l-r T , ^ ^ i ]  <  7 <  1
is a sufficient condition to get a collusive outcome.
Remark 2. When discounting is small enough and (15) holds, collusion is actually a 
subgame perfect equilibrium.
If expression (15) holds, then the market is served at monopoly price and the 
familiar perfectly contestable outcome, that is, price set at the competitive level, is 
not attainable. The result holds even if s = 0. Notice that expression (14) is not 
satisfied if T =  0. The instantaneous price response makes entry impossible and a 
collusive outcome cannot be achieved if T = 0. These results are obtained under the 
assumption that the proportion 7 is exogenously given: one could construct a more 
complex game in which firms have also to establish the fraction of the market they 
will enjoy. Finally observe that the result obtained here holds under the assumption 




























































































outcome may not arise7: in particular, with a larger number of entrants (e.g. moving 
simultaneously) it is possible that none of them would actually enter.
Like in Section 2, the result obtained here shows that instantaneous response 
lags may alter the equilibrium outcome and can lead the incumbent to ignore the 
threat of entry.
More generally, this result is linked to the discrete formulation, that is to the 
fact that the period length during which firms can change their actions matters, and 
so some behavioural rules which cannot be supported as solutions to discrete 
formulations could be supported in games in continuous time where players can 
change their actions instantaneously.
Put another way, the problem in this formulation is in the incumbent's "cost of 
adjustment", which is extreme. The cost of changing the price before the 
commitment period has elapsed is in fact infinite, after which it drops to zero.
As is well known, the question of discrete vs continuous time formulations has 
been developed particularly within the literature on repeated games. Anderson 
(1984), for example, uses a "quick response" argument in a different context. He 
considers a discrete approximation of a continuous game, where players incur 
adjustment costs in changing their actions from one period to the next. He considers 
the limit of subgame perfect equilibria as the length of period approaches zero and 
shows that price matching policy for oligopolistic firms and thus kinked demand 
equilibria can be supported as quick response equilibria.
A similar argument can be found in Marschak and Selten (1978) for "inertia 
supergames", where inertia in decision making is formalised through the cost of 





























































































4. THE EXIT DECISION
The previous sections have stressed the role of pre-entry competition in 
establishing the incumbent's behaviour. Here on the contrary we explore the exit 
decision of the entrant -  that is, at what time the entrant exits, should it enter the 
industry -  by referring to post-entry competition. In other words, in this section we 
deal with actual entry and not with threat of entry.
Under the assumptions of contestable markets, the exit decision is easily 
understable. The "hit-and-run" strategy is the optimal one given that after T periods 
the incumbent reacts to entry and is assumed not to exit from the market. In other 
words, the following three conditions are met:
(i) complete information,
(ii) price war incurred by firms after T periods,
(iii) larger "staying power" for the incumbent, i.e., larger number of periods the 
incumbent can endure a price war before exiting.
When there is complete information, the solution is straightforward8. There is no 
reason to fight if the firms' "staying power" is common knowledge: the one which can 
endure an aggressive response for a shorter time exits immediately. Obviously, the 
result is not straightforward if incomplete information is introduced9, for example, on 
the firms' "staying power". If it is not common knowledge that the incumbent never 
exits, then e's optimal exit time will depend on the subjective probability that e 
assigns to firm i's "staying power". Finally, it is not straightforward that the optimal 
strategy for e is to exit as soon as i reacts to e's entry, when the possibility that both 
firms can coexist after e's entry is considered and the post-entry game is modeled as a 




























































































We analyse the last question mentioned above: i.e., under what conditions 
would an entrant "voluntarily" exit (i.e. before i actually reacts to entry) in an 
industry where both "fight" and “cooperation" are i's possible strategies after e's 
entry?
Let us consider an industry with two firms i and e. Firms act in discrete time 
and their horizon is infinite. We assume that firm e unconditionally enters the 
market, i.e., we consider only the subgame after e's entry. In particular, we assume 
that there is a preliminary period -T , the "hit-and-run" period, in which firm e makes 
positive profits by undercutting firm i, given that i cannot react to e's entry until time 
t =  0, because of a response lag of length T. We assume that i's profits during the 
"hit-and-run" period are non positive. We allow firm e the faculty to exit before firm 
i can react to e's entry. If firm e exits, then firm i becomes a monopolist. If firm e 
stays in, then the two firms play a game in which firm i moves first in each period, 
deciding whether to "fight" (F) or "cooperate" (C), after which firm e moves, deciding 
whether to stay in (S) or to exit forever (E). We can interpret the decision of 
"fighting" and "cooperating" as in the previous sections: "fight" means that the two 
firms incur a price war which is assumed to end up with losses for both firms, if both 
firms stay in; "cooperate" means that the two firms agree in sharing the market 
according to some rule which is not necessary to specify here. In the sequel we will not 
specify the pricing strategy underlying "fighting" and "cooperating", but we will deal 
with reduced forms only, i.e. the profits resulting from these actions.
Let us consider the payoffs for each period, assuming that they only depend on 
the strategies and not on the time period. Firm e does not incur any exit cost and 
earns zero profits when it plays E: that is, Ile(F,E) =  IIg(C,E) =  0. Let Ile(F,S) and 
Ile(C,S) denote firm e's profits when it plays S and firm i is playing F or C, 
respectively. Analogously, we denote by IL(F,S) and IL(C,S) firm i's profits when 




























































































with E (in this case no F or C actually take place). Let II denote the one period 
monopoly profit. Firms discount future profits at the same rate r, 0 <  r < 1. The 
following assumptions are made:
A.3. IL(F,S) < rL(F,E) < 0 < ri;(C,S) < n;(C,E)
a .4. ne( F ,s ) < o < n e(C,s)
A.5. n i(F.s) + L  = 1r‘ nm > ^ 0 r‘ ni( c >S)
A.5 means that if i can drive e out of the market by fighting one period, then i 
will prefer fighting one period and then earning monopoly profits rather than 
cooperating forever.
In what follows we assume that firm e can endure "fight" only for a finite 
number of periods, say Ye: in other words, firm e will be certainly driven out of the 
market after Ye periods of "fighting". Moreover, we assume that firm i can fight only 
for a finite number of periods, say Yi. Let us suppose that:
A.6. Y i > Y e
Alternatively, Yj may be infinite. Notice that the case Y; = oo is considered in the 
theory of contestable markets, since firm i never exits. The following result holds:
Proposition 4- Under A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, the "hit^and -run" strategy is the unique




























































































Proof. The proof follows from the following remark. Since subgame perfection 
requires e playing S following any C branch (indeed playing S is preferred to playing E 
since n  (C,S) > 0), then by A.5 i does not choose C because e does not exit unless i 
plays F and it is common knowledge that e will certainly exit after Ye periods of 
fighting. Therefore let us consider i always playing F. At Ye, if i plays F, after 
fighting all previous periods, then e will be driven out of the industry. Therefore e will 
play E. Now consider period Ye -1 : again if i plays F after fighting all previous 
periods, then e will exit, since playing S brings it to period Ye where it plays E. By 
repeating the same argument for each period, e chooses to exit before i can react to e's 
being in (i.e., e exits before time 0 starts). The only SPE is therefore the 
"hit-and-run" strategy. |
Firm e enters in period -T  and then "voluntarily" exits, following a 
"hit-and-run" strategy. Of course, this exit is not voluntary since e exits only 
because i is threatening its fight. However, to an observer it would appear voluntary 
as no fights have actually taken place. We note that in order to get the "hit-and-run" 
strategy as a unique SPE a strong asymmetry between firms is to be imposed. Firm e 
can decide whether or not to stay in, but must passively accept firm i's decision on 
whether or not to fight, that is, firm i is assumed to move first. Moreover, firm i never 
exits, or, alternatively, A .6 must hold. In particular, it does not matter how large Yj 
is: the crucial thing is that Yc is smaller than Yp Indeed, if Ye is not smaller than Y ;10 
then, besides "hit-and-run", cooperation is a possible equilibrium solution to this 
game.
Let us consider now the possibility that e can reenter after exiting 
(alternatively, interpret it as many potential entrants that enter sequentially, where 
the k-th entrant enters after the (k -l)-th  one has exited, and so on). We suppose that 




























































































incurring sunk costs in a way that it is still convenient to "hit-and-run" ad infinitum1! 
In this case, firm i will be able to keep e from ever actually staying in only by playing 
"fight" in every period. Indeed, if e reenters after exiting and i fights, e will play exit, 
given that staying in yields ng(F,S) <  0 and exiting yields 0. This repetition of 
exiting and re-entering can go on indefinitely under the assumption that the entrant 
will earn non-negative profits by playing the "hit-and-run"strategy. Notice however 
that under assumption A.3 it is not optimal for i to play "fight". Therefore the only 





























































































Two major questions, which are interrelated, have been tackled in this paper, 
namely the role of commitments in the process of entry and exit; and the relation 
between pre-entry and post-entry competition. These issues have been discussed 
with particular regard to the contestable market approach.
It is well-known that these questions have also been investigated within the 
"capital commitment" literature12. However, the predictions of the "capital 
commitment" literature differ markedly from those of contestability theory as far as 
the effects of pre-entry and post-entry competition are concerned. In the former 
approach the role of pre-entry price is deemphasized, while preemptive investments 
and sunk costs, which are more credible deterrents, are stressed. On the contrary, in 
the theory of contestable markets post-entry competition is absent and hence 
pre-entry competition is most effective: in particular, the more competitive is 
post-entry competition, the less effective is the market discipline provided by 
potential competition.
In this paper it has been shown how sensitive the conclusions of contestability 
theory are to the assumptions: in particular, it has been argued that costlessly 
reversible entry by itself does not lead automatically to the nirvana of social 
optimality (see Sections 2 and 3).
A few issues for possible further research strategies can be identified. One is the 
question of information. If there is some doubt in the minds of the potential entrants 
concerning the incumbent's behaviour, an equilibrium with "reputation effects" may 
arise. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) show that it does 
not take very much uncertainty on the part of entrants about the incumbent, before 
an equilibrium emerges with reputation effects. The question then arises: how might 




























































































context? Surely it would generate game-theoretic interactions if it does not deter 
entry.
Another issue is the one of adjustment costs. In the contestable markets inertia 
in decision-making is formalised only on the side of the incumbent by assuming a 
T-period commitment to price decisions. In particular, the incumbent's "cost of 
adjustment" is extreme: before the commitment period has elapsed.it is infinite, while 
after T it drops to zero. Subtler forms of inertia should then be introduced since this 
way of modeling adjustment costs remains crude.
The concept of commitment is intimately related to the idea of reaction. The 
simplest way of accomplishing both concepts is to assume that firms move 
sequentially. In order to get contestability results we have to assume sequentiality as 
the only possible timing of moves: in particular, it matters whether the incumbent or 
the entrants move first (see Section 4) and whether the incumbent is allowed to exit or 
not. Contestability imposes an asymmetry between entrants and incumbents: the 
entrant can decide whether or not to be in the industry, but must passively accept the 
incumbent's decision on whether or not to fight; furthermore, the incumbent is not 
allowed to exit. Also in this sense, perfect contestability theory does not seem to be 
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1 Fixed costs persist only as long as production continues, but are, strictly speaking, 
independent of scale. Pure sunk costs continue as a liability forever, they are 
incurred with or without production. Whether or not costs are sunk depends on the 
resale market for capital assets. Whether or not costs are fixed depends on the extent 
to which they vary with output.
2 Baumol and Willig (1986), p.103.
3 See, for example, the discussion in Brock (1983), Shepherd (1984) , Weitzman 
(1983). For empirical appraisal see the works surveyed in Schwartz (1986), Baumol 
and Willig (1986).
4 The last assumption means that there exists a discount rate such that the losses 
during the period of aggressive response plus the discounted flow of monopoly profits 
thereafter are greater than the discounted flow of profits that the incumbent gets by 
playing soft.
5 denotes the set of positive read numbers.
8 Assuming that g is twice differentiable, a sufficient condition for Il(p) to be strictly 
quasi-concave on [c ,+ oo ) is the following: g(p)-g"(p) <  2(g '(p))2 for all p >  c. 
Indeed, under that condition, n"(p) <  0 for all p >  c such that n'(p) =  0.
7 Prof. S. Martin has kindly brought to my attention the fact that contestable 
markets theorists would appeal to the case where there is an infinite number of 
potential entrants or at least so many potential entrants that there is always one 
outside the market, no matter how many actually come in.
8 See for example the solution in Ghemawatt and Nalebuff (1985) to the exit decision 
in a complete information framework.
9 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) for the analysis of the exit decision in "wars of 
attrition" with incomplete information.
10 In this case the game appears as an infinitely repeated "reverse 
chain-store-paradox", where we interpret it as a problem of exit and not of entry 
(see Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, Appendix A).
11 It means that there exists a discount rate such that the discounted flow of profits 
earned in the "hit-and-run" periods is greater than the discounted flow of sunk costs. 
Obviously, if firm e could reenter only for a finite number of times, the result of 
Proposition 4 would still apply. For a discussion of reentry costs with reference to 
predation see Ordover and Willig (1981).




























































































WORKING PAPERS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
86/206: Volker DEVILLE Bibliography on The European Monetary 
System and the European Currency Unit.
86/212: Emil CLAASSEN 
Melvyn KRAUSS
Budget Deficits and the Exchange 
Rate
86/214: Alberto CHILOSI The Right to Employment Principle and 
Self-Managed Market Socialism: A 
Historical Account and an Analytical 
Appraisal of some Old Ideas
86/218: Emil CLAASSEN The Optimum Monetary Constitution: 
Monetary Integration and Monetary 
Stability
86/222: Edmund S. PHELPS Economic Equilibrium and Other Economic 
Concepts: A "New Palgrave" Quartet
86/223: Giuliano FERRARI BRAVO Economic Diplomacy. The Keynes-Cuno 
Affair
86/224: Jean-Michel GRANDMONT Stabilizing Competitive Business Cycles
86/225: Donald A.R. GEORGE Wage-earners’ Investment Funds: theory, 
simulation and policy
86/227: Domenico Mario NUTI Michal Kalecki’s Contributions to the 
Theory and Practice of Socialist Planning
86/228: Domenico Mario NOTI Codetermination, Profit-Sharing and Full 
Employment
86/229: Marcello DE CECCO Currency, Coinage and the Gold Standard
86/230: Rosemarie FEITHEN Determinants of Labour Migration in an 
Enlarged European Community
86/232: Saul ESTRIN 
Derek C. JONES
Are There Life Cycles in Labor-Managed 
Firms? Evidence for France
86/226: Will BARTLETT 
Milica ÜVALIC
Labour Managed Firms, Employee Participa­
tion and Profit Sharing - Theoretical 
Perspectives and European Experience.
86/240: Domenico Mario NOTI Information, Expectations and Economic 
Planning



























































































86/242: Marcello DE CECCO Financial Innovations and Monetary Theory
86/243: Pierre DEHEZ 
Jacques DREZE
Competitive Equilibria with Increasing 
Returns
86/244: Jacques PECK 
Karl SHELL
Market Uncertainty: Correlated Equilibrium 
and Sunspot Equilibrium in Market Games
86/245: Domenico Mario NUTI Profit-Sharing and Employment: Claims and 
Overclaims
86/246: Karol Attila SOOS Informal Pressures, Mobilization, and 
Campaigns in the Management of Centrally 
Planned Economies
86/247: Tamas BAUER Reforming or Perfecting the Economic 
Mechanism in Eastern Europe
86/257: Luigi MONTRUCCHIO Lipschitz Continuous Policy Functions for 
Strongly Concave Optimization Problems
87/264: Pietro REICHLIN Endogenous Fluctuations in a Two-Sector 
Overlapping Generations Economy
87/265: Bernard CORNET The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex 
Economies
87/267: Edmund PHELPS Recent Studies of Speculative Markets 
in the Controversy over Rational Expecta­
tions
87/268: Pierre DEHEZ 
Jacques DREZE
Distributive Production Sets and Equilibria 
with Increasing Returns




Quantity Guided Price Setting
87/276: Paul MARER Can Joint Ventures in Hungary Serve as 
a "Bridge" to the CMEA Market?
87/277: Felix FITZROY Efficiency Wage Contracts, Unemployment, 
and Worksharing
87/279: Darrell Dl'FFIE 
Wayne SHAFER
Equilibrium and the Role of the Firm 
in Incomplete Markets
87/280: Martin SHUBIK A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory 



























































































-  3 -
87/283: Leslie T. OXLEY 
Donald A.R. GEORGE
Perfect Foresight, Non-Linearity and 
Hyperinflation
87/284 : Saul ESTRIN 
Derek C. JONES
The Determinants of Workers’ Participation 
and Productivity in Producer Cooperatives
87/285: Domenico Mario NUTI Financial Innovation under Market Socialism
87/286: Felix FITZROY Unemployment and the Share Economy: 
A Sceptical Note
87/287: Paul HARE Supply Multipliers in a Centrally Planned 
Economy with a Private Sector
87/288: Roberto TAMBORINI The Stock Approach to the Exchange Rate: 
An Exposition and a Critical Appraisal
87/289: Corrado BENASSI Asymmetric Information and Financial 
Markets: from Financial Intermediation 
to Credit Rationing
87/296: Gianna GIANNELLI On Labour Market Theories
87/297: Domenica TROPEANO The Riddle of Foreign Exchanges: A 
Swedish-German Debate (1917-1919)
87/305: G. VAN DER LAAN 
A.J.J. TALMAN
Computing Economic Equilibria by Variable 
Dimension Algorithms: State of the Art
87/306: Paolo GABELLA Adverse Selection and Intermediation
87/307: Jean-Michel GRANDMONT Local Bifurcations and Stationary 
Sunspots
87/308: Birgit GRODAL 
Werner HILDENBRAND
Income Distributions and the Axiom 
of Revealed Preference
87/309: Eric PEREE 
Alfred STEINHERR
Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Foreign 
Trade
87/312: Pietro REICHLIN Output-Inflation Cycles in an Economy with 
Staggered Wage Setting
87/319: Peter RAPPOPORT 
Lucrezia REICHLIN
Segmented Trends and Nonstationary 
Time Series
87/320: Douglas GALE A Strategic Model of Labor Markets 
with Incomplete Information




























































































-  4 -
87/322: Keith PIL3EAM Sterilization and the Profitability 
of UK Intervention 1973-86
87/323: Alan KIRMAN The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic 
Theory
87/324: Andreu MAS-COLELL An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining 
Set
88/329: Dalia MARIN Assessing Structural Change: the Case 
of Austria
88/330: Milica UVALIC "Shareholding" in Yugoslav Theory and 
Practice
88/331: David CANNING Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence 
of Games with Learning
88/332: Dalia MARIN Trade and Scale Economies. A causality 
test for the US, Japan, Germany and the 
UK.




Piece Rates with Endogenous Monitoring: 
Some theory and evidence
88/337: Domenico Mario NUTI On Traditional Cooperatives and James 
Meade’s Labour-Capital Discriminating 
Partnerships
88/338: Pietro REICHLIN 
Paolo SICONOLFI
Government Debt and Equity Capital in 
an Economy with Credit Rationing
88/339: Alfred STEINHERR The EMS with the ECU at Centerstage: 
a proposal for reform of the European 
rate system
88/340: Frederick VAN DER PLOEG Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Inter­
dependent Economies with Capital 
Accumulation, Death and Population Growth
88/341: David CANNING Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy 
without a Forward Market for Labour
88/344: Joerg MAYER Intervention Mechanisms and Symmetry 
in the EMS




























































































88/348: Milica UVALIC The Investment 3enaviour of the Labour- 
Managed Firm: an econometric analysis
88/351: Alan P. KIRMAN On Ants and Markets
88/352: Gianna GIANNELLI Labour Demand, Pricing and Investment 
Decisions in Italy: An econometric 
Analysis
88/353: Niall 0'HIGGINS The Progressivity of Government Taxes and 
Benefits in Ireland: a comparison of two 
measures of redistributive impact
88/356: Mary MCCARTHY 
Lucrezla REICHLIN
Do Women Cause Unemployment? Evidence 
from Eight O.E.C.D. Countries
88/357: Richard M. GOODWIN Chaotic Economic Dynamics
88/358: Fernando PACHECO 
Eric PEREE 
Francisco S. TORRES
Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty
88/360: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Relations between the European 
Community and CMEA
88/361: Domenico Mario NUTI Remonetisation and Capital Markets in 
the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies
88/362: Domenico Mario NUTI The New Soviet Cooperatives: Advances 
and Limitations
88/368: Stephen MARTIN Joint Ventures and Market Performance 
in Oligopoly
89/370: B. BENS AID 
Robert GARY-30B0 
S. SIDERBUSCH
The Strategic Aspects of Profit-Sharing 
in the Industr3̂
89/374: Francisco S. TORRES Small Countries and Exogenous Policy 
Shocks
89/375: Renzo DAVIDDI Rouble Convertibility: a Realistic Target?
89/377: Elettra AGLIARDI On the Robustness of Contestability Theory
89/378: Stephan MARTIN The Welfare Consequences of Transaction





















































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European University Institute. Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge - depending on the availability of stocks - from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
I - 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesoiana




































































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1988
88/329: Dalia MARIN Assessing Structural Change: The Case 
of Austria *
88/330: Milica UVALIC "Shareholding" in Yugoslav Theory and 
Practice
88/331: David CANNING Convergence to Equilibrium in a 
Sequence of Games with Learning
88/332: Dalia MARIN Trade and Scale Economies. A causality 
test for the U.S., Japan, Germany and 
the UK
88/333: Keith PILBEAM Fixed versus Floating Exchange Races 
Revisited
88/334: Hans Ulrich Jessurun 
d'OLIVEIRA
Die EWG und die Versalzung des Rheins
88/335: Felix Fitzroy and 
Kornelius Kraft
Piece Rates with Endogenous Monitoring 
Some Theory and Evidence
88/336: Norbert LORENZ Die Ubertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf 
die Europaischen Gemeinschaften 
- verfassungsrechtliche Chancen und 
Grenzen einer europaischen Integration 
erlautert am Beispiel der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Frankreichs und Italiens -
88/337: Domenico Mario NUTI On Traditional Cooperatives and James 
Meade's Labour-Capital Discriminacing 
Partnerships
88/338: Pietro REICHLIN and 
Paolo SICONOLFI
Government Debt and Equity Capital in 
an Economy with Credit Rationing
88/339: Alfred STEINHERR The EMS with the ECU at Centerstage:
A proposal for reform of the European 
Exchange rate system
88/340: Frederick VAN DER PLOEG Monetary and Fiscal Policy in 
Interdependent Economies with Capital 
Accumulation, Death and Population 
Growth
88/341: David CANNING Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy 
without a Forward Market for Labour
88/342: Gunther TEUBNER "And God Laughed..." 
Indeterminacy, Self-Reference and 
Paradox in Law
88/343: Jean BLONDEL Ministerial Careers in Western 
European Governments




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1988
88/344: Joerg MAYER Intervention Mechanisms and Symmetry 
in the EMS
88/345: Keith PILBEAM Exchange Rate Management and the Risk 
Premium
88/346: Efisio ESPA The Structure and Methodology of 
International Debt Statistics
88/347: Francese MORATA and 
and J a urne VERNET
Las Asambleas Régionales en Italia 
y Espana: Organizacion Institucional 
y Réglas de Funclonamiento
88/348: Milica UVALIC The Investment Behaviour of the 
Labour-Managed Firm: Ar. Econometric 
Analysis
88/349: Massimo PANEBIANCO Inter-Regional Co-Operat ion in the 
North-South Dialogue 
Latin America and the European 
Community
88/350: Gregorio ROBLES La Cour de Justice des CE et les 
Principes Généraux du droit
88/351: Alan KIRMAN On Ants and Markets
88/352: Gianna GIANNELLI Labour Demand, Pricing and Investment 
Decisions in Italy: An Sconcmetric 
Analysis
88/353: Niall O'HIGGINS The Progressivity of Government Taxes 
and Benefits in Ireland: A Comparison 
of Two Measures of Redistributive 
Impact
88/354: Christian JOERGES Amerikanische und deutsche 
Traditionen der soziologischen 
Jurisprudenz and der Rechtskritik
88/355: Summary of Conference, 
debates and abstracts
The Future Financing of the EC Budget: 
EPU Conference 16-17 October 1987
of selected interventions
88/356: Mary MCCARTHY and 
Lucrezia REICHLIN
Do Women Cause Unemployment?
Evidence From Eight O.E.C.D. Countries
88/357: Richard M. GOODWIN Chaotic Economic Dynamics
88/358: Fernando PACHECO 
Eric PEERE and 
Francisco S. TORRES
Duopoly Under Demand Uncertainty
88/359: Jaakko NOUSIAINEN Substance and Style of Cabinet 
Decision-Making




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 1989
88/360: Domenico Mario NUTI 
88/361: Domenico Mario NUTI
88/362: Domenico Mario NUTI 
88/363: Reiner GRUNDMANN 
88/364: Tony PROSSER
88/365: Silke BRAMMER 
88/366: Goesta ESPING-ANDERSEN
88/367: Goesta ESPING-ANDERSEN 
Paul FARSUND and 
Jon Eivind KOLBERG
Economic Relations between the 
European Community and CMEA
Remonetisation and Capital Markets in 
the Reform of Centrally Planned 
Economies
The New Soviet Cooperatives: Advances 
and Limitations
Marx and the Domination of Nature 
Alienation, Technology and Communism
The Privatisation of Public 
Enterprises in France and Great 
Britain
The State, Constitutions and Public 
Policy
Die Kompetenzen der EG im Bereich 
Binnenmarkt nach der Einheitlichen 
Europaischen Akte
The Three Political Economies of the 
Welfare State
Decommodification and Work Absence in 
the Welfare Stare
88/368: Stephen MARTIN Joint Ventures and Market Performance 
in Oligopoly
88/369: Giuseppe RAO The Italian Broadcasting System: Legal 
and Political Aspects
89/370: B. BENSAID/ The Strategic Aspects of Profit
S. FEDERBUSCH/ Sharing in the Industry
R.J. GARY BOBO
89/371: Klaus-Dieter STADLER
89/372: Jean Philiippe Robé
89/373: Giovanni FEDERICO/ 
Antonio TENA
Die Europaische Zusammenarbeit in der 
Generalversammlung der Vereinten 
Nationen zu Beginn der Achtziger Jahre
Countervailing Duties, State 
Protectionism and the Challenge of 
the Uruguay Round
On the Accuracy of Historical 
International Foreign Trade Statistics 
Morgenstern Revisited
89/374: Francisco TORRES Small Countries and Exogenous Policy 
Shocks




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSI'IY INSTITUTE APRIL 1989
89/375: Renzo DAVIDDI Rouble Convertibility: 
A Realistic Target?
89/376: Jean STAROBINSKI Benjamin Constant:
La fonction de 1'eloquence
89/377: Elettra AGLIARDI On the Robustness of Contestability 
Theory
89/378: Stephen MARTIN The Welfare Consequences of 
Transaction Costs in Financial Markets
89/379: Augusto De Benedetti L'equilibrio difficile. Linee di 
politica industriale e sviluppo 
dell'impresa elettrica nell'Italia 
meridionale: la Società Meridionale 
di Elettricità nel periodo di 
transizione, 1925-1937
* :Working Paper out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
